Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the crisis-stricken countries in Europe have been pushed to take drastic steps to consolidate their fi nances and reduce their budget defi cits. Despite strong public opposition and largely damaging short-run effects, the countries have undertaken many of the internationally recommended/mandated reforms and spending cuts. In this Forum, authors from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal report on the fi scal consolidation achieved in their respective countries -and the sacrifi ces that have made it possible. Furthermore, the authors detail what remains to be done to resolve the crisis. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-013-0441-3 Vassilis Monastiriotis A Very Greek Crisis ployment rates were declining and a dynamic business class was developing, while levels of consumption and wealth accumulation were unprecedented.
These developments were given their symbolic culmination in 2004, when the country successfully hosted the Summer Olympics (the smallest country to have done so in the history of the Games) and its national football team won the UEFA European Championship. A year later, Greece even won the Eurovision song contest! By 2005, Greece was unquestionably a success story: in socio-economic terms, the country had all but converged to the development levels of "Europe"; in political-economic terms, it had reinstated itself fi rmly on the map of the "European core". How all this changed so dramatically in the space of just a few months -from September 2009, when Greece fi rst indicated a substantial divergence from its budget defi cit target, to February 2010, when the Greek government openly admitted that it was unable to refinance its debt through market borrowing -must be a stupefying puzzle to any outside observer.
But it happened. Behind this fl ashy picture, structural problems persisted in the Greek economy, politics and society: problems of clientelism and corruption, problems of policy making and governance, and problems of competitiveness (a weak industrial base, strong product market rigidities and a mounting current account defi cit). Largely owing to these, as is well known by now, Greece closed the 2009 fi nancial year with a budget defi cit of 15.8% (which, at the time, was estimated at 12.7%). As borrowing rates started climbing towards 10%, the country asked its eurozone and IMF partners for an emergency loan -a bailout package -and in May 2010 it was granted a loan worth a staggering €110bn, in a move that seemed to violate all EMU principles and of a size With little doubt, the last three years have seen for Greece one of the most astonishing reversals of fortunes a country has ever experienced. For about ten years beginning in the mid-1990s, Greece seemed almost unable to do anything wrong. The country was growing at amazing rates, by some 4.5% per year, a performance surpassed within the European Union only by Ireland. By the year 2000, it had achieved an impressive convergence programme, bringing down its infl ation rates and budget defi cits from the double-digit fi gures of the 1980s to within the strict limits of the Maastricht rules. In the process, Greece seemed to have dealt successfully with a number of historical challenges: the huge shock of postcommunist transition in its neighbourhood, as it rather seamlessly absorbed a migration infl ow representing some 10% of its population; the challenge of market liberalisation and economic modernisation, as it successfully implemented a number of deregulation/liberalisation policies including central bank independence and the privatisation of public utilities and the banking sector; and the Maastricht challenge, as it achieved its political goal of entry into the common currency with only a one-year delay.
In the dawn of the new millennium, Greece seemed to have transformed itself in numerous respects. For the fi rst time in its history, it became a net capital exporter, with impressive foreign investments in the banking sector, in telecommunications, energy and increasingly in a wider range of activities. Political instability and contestation had given their place to "good governance" and concerted social dialogue. Transport and ICT infrastructure had also been upgraded immensely (despite problems with the implementation of the Cohesion Policy), a shift to green energy and modern technologies was slowly taking place, and Athens had been transformed, by universal admission, into a truly cosmopolitan capital. Unem-21%) and in taxes on petrol, cigarettes and alcohol along with some parametric changes in income taxes; and some moderate cuts in expenditures (including in public investment) and central government operating costs. The fi rst Memorandum of May 2010 introduced a much more pervasive set of measures. Wages in public utilities were cut initially by 3%; the socalled 13th and 14th salaries (bonuses for Christmas, Easter and annual leave) were capped at €500 for public sector employees, €400 for pensioners and completely abolished for high-wage earners; VAT rates increased further (to 23%) and additional tax hikes were imposed on luxury consumption (e.g. an additional 10% tax on imported cars), on so-called inelastic expenditures (alcohol, cigarettes and fuel) and on property; additional levies were imposed on high pension earners and business profi ts; and further savings were envisaged through controls on public expenditure and investment. The Memorandum also saw a radical reform of the pension system (voted on in Parliament in July 2010). The retirement that surpassed that of the loans granted to Europe under the Marshall Plan. With this loan (and subsequent ones) came a strict and pervasive conditionality for the implementation of a broad range of reforms and fi scal consolidation actions. It is widely recognised that Greece has been slow to implement the agreed measures, showing both problems of implementation/capacity and a general lack of commitment. Still, for three years now Greece has been implementing perhaps the most extensive fi scal consolidation programme seen in Europe -and in doing so it has gotten itself into a deep and prolonged recession and, for many, a vicious circle of austerityinduced recession and recession-induced fi scal derailment.
Much has been said -and plenty more will be said in the future -about the wisdom and appropriateness of this "solution". Trapped within its own political constraints -excessive trust in the political economy of incentives (the fear of "moral hazard") and a self-defeating adherence to rules -the eurozone was unable to react quickly and boldly to address the solvency problems of Greece.
1 Its sloppiness and indecision fuelled uncertainty with regard to Greece's continued membership in the EMU and assigned an elevated role to fi nancial markets and institutions to dictate economic developments, leading to a realisation of the much-feared domino effect as the crisis spread to Portugal and Spain. But in comparison to the countries in the rest of the "European south", the management of the crisis in Greece has been much more complex and the impact of austerity much more pervasive. I argue that despite valid criticisms about the policy recipe, the explanation for "the Greek predicament" lies predominantly with failures observed in the domestic policy fi eld.
Reform and fi scal consolidation effort in Greece
Despite its negative reputation concerning its commitment to reforms and its implementation record, Greece has put forth an immense effort over the last three years and indeed has taken impressive steps toward achieving fi scal sustainability, with occasionally remarkable results. In the three years since the beginning of the crisis, it implemented a fi scal tightening of some 20% of GDP (around €50bn, while it has committed to measures cumulatively totalling €65bn by 2015) and reduced its budget defi cit by an impressive nine percentage points, despite having lost a fi fth of its GDP since 2009. How did this come about?
After some initial hesitation in the wake of the crisis, some fi rst measures were announced in February and March 2010 -before the fi rst bailout. These included a 10% cut in salaried bonuses and a recruitment freeze in the "narrow public sector" (central government); increases in VAT rates (from 19% to 
